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Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) is a remarkable therapy succeeding where all manner
of pharmacological manipulations and brain transplants fail. The success of DBS has
resurrected the relevance of electrophysiology and dynamics on the order of milliseconds.
Despite the remarkable effects of DBS, its mechanisms of action are largely unknown.
There has been an expanding catalogue of various neuronal and neural responses to DBS
or DBS-like stimulation but no clear conceptual encompassing explanatory scheme has
emerged despite the technological prowess and intellectual sophistication of the scientists
involved. Something is amiss. If the scientific observations are sound, then why has there
not been more progress? The alternative is that it may be the hypotheses that frame
the questions are at fault as well as the methods of inference (logic) used to validate
the hypotheses. An analysis of the past and current notions of the DBS mechanisms
of action is the subject in order to identify the presuppositions (premises) and logical
fallacies that may be at fault. The hope is that these problems will be avoided in the
future so the DBS can realize its full potential quickly. In this regard, the discussion of
the methods of inference and presuppositions that underlie many current notions is no
different then a critique of experimental methods common in scientific discussions and
consequently, examinations of the epistemology and logic are appropriate. This analysis is
in keeping with the growing appreciation among scientists and philosophers of science,
the scientific observations (data) to not “speak for themselves” nor is the scientific
method self-evidently true and that consideration of the underlying inferential methods
is necessary.
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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF DEEP BRAIN STIMULATION (DBS)
The effectiveness and safety of Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS)
for an expanding array of neurological and psychiatric disorders
has been remarkable on a number of different levels. It is the
most effective therapy for an expanding array of neurological
and psychiatric disorders where DBS succeeds where all man-
ner of medications, biologics, and gene therapies do not provide
comparable benefit. In many ways, DBS harkens back to what
may now be a lost notion, that the brain may have properties
uniquely instantiated in the electrical activities distinct from those
of neurotransmitters. If so, then physiology is not synonymous
with neurotransmitter action, the contrary notion could reason-
ably argued has dominating much thinking in physiology and
pathophysiology (Valenstein, 2005).
While many tens of thousands of patients have had dra-
matic improvements in the quality of their lives through DBS,
a fair question is what has been the nature of that success. The
enormous clinical benefits do notmean that there have been com-
parable advances in understanding the therapeutic mechanisms
of action of DBS. In other words, it was not the case of reason-
ing as follows: DBS acts via mechanism A and it is known that
disease X causes a change Y in structure Z that is amendable
to mechanism A and consequently, DBS of structure Z should
be effective in disease X. One merely has to look at the clinical
targets of DBS to realize that they follow from previous targets
of surgical ablations, with only rare exceptions. One exception
has been DBS of the subgenu cingulum based on changes in
neurometabolic imaging demonstrating increased metabolism in
specific brain regions in patients refractory to standard thera-
pies (Mayberg et al., 2005). However, even this development was
based on what is now probably a false presupposition that high
frequency stimulation inhibits or suppresses local neuronal activ-
ity (Montgomery and Gale, 2008). The other exception is DBS of
the intralaminar nuclei of the thalamus for minimally conscious
states (Schiff et al., 2007).
The concern noted above is not at all to deny the remarkable,
indeed revolutionary contributions of DBS nor its potential to
continue to make remarkable contributions. Nor does the con-
cern deny the remarkable number of studies on DBS mechanisms
ranging from recordings in reduced “slice” preparations to neu-
rometabolic studies. However, the claim made here is that this
very large cataloging of observations has not resulted in any clear
understanding. Can anyone say which of the often conflicting
observations is THE DBS mechanism?
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ISSUES OF CONCERN
The paucity of understanding DBS mechanisms is despite nearly
a quarter of a century of renewed interest in brain stimulation
for neurological disorders. Any scientist has to be concerned. The
lack of progress cannot bemerely attributed to the lack of research
support. The reason, it is claimed here, lies with errors in much
past and present research, which unless realized, will plague future
research. The fact is the past and current experiments were techni-
cally sound, observationally true, and conducted by very talented
and intelligent investigators. Yet, an understanding depends on
how inferences are made from the data. Thus, the central claims
of this discussion to be demonstrated is that many of the infer-
ences that have and continue to be drawn are probably false as
they are based on faulty presuppositions and logical errors. Just
as scientists accept the appropriateness of discussions of experi-
mental methods, it is hoped that the same appreciation will be
extended to this discussion of inferential methods.
The purpose here is not to review all of the literature related to
possible DBS mechanisms, which would be far beyond the scope
of this article. Rather, the primary purpose is to review the epis-
temic nature of the inferences or claims made about the DBS
mechanisms. Only examples from the literature that demonstrate
or illuminate the epistemic issues are cited. As will be seen, there
are at least two aspects to be discussed. First are the effects of log-
ical fallacies on the progress in research on DBS mechanisms. The
fundamental paradox is that the logical fallacies at first appear
very reasonable, indeed central to the scientific method. As well
be shown, these paradoxes are important in hypothesis generation
but are counterproductive when confused for rules of evidence, as
has been the case in DBS research.
The second issue relates to the question of “theory-free”
observations. As will be demonstrated, what constitutes relevant
experimental designs, observations and inferences draw heav-
ily on presuppose theories of pathophysiology, for example the
Globus Pallidus Interna (GPi) Rate theory that posits overactiv-
ity of the GPi as causal to parkinsonism. Again, the purpose here
is not to extensively review the various theories of pathophysiol-
ogy that have informed, or misinformed, DBS research. Rather,
only selected aspects of these theories that illustrate the effects of
presuppositions on DBS research are cited.
In a sense, this paper is a guide to the interpretation of obser-
vational data, particularly as warnings as to how observations can
be misinterpreted and misused. It is a review only in the sense of
using the past to warn the future. To focus only on cataloging past
observations would be to reduce the paper’s value to the future.
The logical fallacies committed are not unique to the science
of DBS in particular or to science in general. Rather, many have
been known and extensively and rigorously studied for millennia.
The understanding of these fallacies is embodied in the philo-
sophical disciplines of epistemology and logic. Indeed, in many
ways logic has the same rigor as mathematics, and just as no sci-
entists would reject the possible contributions of mathematics,
similarly scientists should not reject out of hand the contributions
of epistemology and logic. Just as mathematical errors render
inferences suspect so do logical errors. In the long history of epis-
temology and logic certain general forms of arguments have been
found faulty, such as, the expression if a implies c and b implies c
therefore a implies b is logically fallacious (the Fallacy of Pseudo-
transitivity) regardless of what specific statements are substituted
for a, b, and c. Thus, one approach in this discussion will be to re-
couch many of the claims related to the mechanisms of action of
DBS into their logical equivalents of well known forms by which
to demonstrate their being logical fallacies.
The paradox is that logical fallacies are integral and neces-
sary for much of scientific progress yet at the same time, they
have been the source of many misconceptions that has lim-
ited DBS research, as will be shown. For example, the Fallacy
of Pseudo-transitivity was seen in equating the similar clinical
benefits between pallidotomy and pallidal DBS with similarity
of mechanisms, specifically that DBS inhibited neuronal activ-
ity or cause a “functional lesion.” This presupposition was a
set back. However, Mary Walker used to the Fallacy of Pseudo-
transitivity to equate weakness of curare poisoning with the
weakness of Myasthenia gravis. She went on to hypothesize the
anti-cholinesterase medications, which benefited patients with
curare poisoning, would help patients with Myasthenia gravis,
and fortunately, it did. The difference in these circumstances
was the in the case of Myasthenia gravis, the Fallacy of Pseudo-
transitivity was used to generate a hypothesis, and not to support
a hypothesis and particularly to discount alternatives, as in the
case in DBS research.
Faulty presuppositions increase the risk that inherently false
hypotheses are subjected to the scientific hypothetico-deductive
method and what is taken as evidence, though, they are false.
Some scientists may object, saying that the means of testing and
rules of evidence are self-evident and they naturally engender
universal acquiescence. But this is judging science by the ideal it
hopes to attain and not the actual history of science, as will be
demonstrated in the history of the science of DBS mechanisms.
Thus far, the therapeutic mechanisms of DBS have escaped
ready and complete explanation despite the over 30 years since
I. Cooper and colleagues first described DBS for movement
disorders as is currently implemented for movement disorders
(Cooper et al., 1980), although, direct electrical stimulation of
the living human brain goes back at least to the late 1800’s
(Bartholow, 1874). This speaks loudly to the possibility that the
wrong questions are being asked. That the wrong questions are
being asked suggests that the presumptions inherent in or leading
to the questions being asked are wrong.
RESURGENCE OF INTEREST IN DBS IN THE 1990’S
The first actual published descriptions of DBS, as currently
practiced, were published by Dieckmann (1979) for psychiatric
disorders and by Cooper et al. (1980) for movement disorders.
However, to the current generation, it appears that DBS was dis-
covered in the late 1980’s with the publications by Benabid et al.
(1987) evidenced by the many references to Benabid as the dis-
coverer of DBS (Williams, 2012). Rather, the important work by
Benabid and colleagues lead to a resurgence in interest of DBS
but primarily as an extension of renewed interest in ablative sur-
gical therapies in the 1980’s. DBS did not reach its current level
of enthusiasm until the early 1990’s (Hariz et al., 2010). The
enthusiasm for DBS followed on the resurgence of interest in the
mid 1980’s of pallidotomies for the treatment of pharmacological
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refractory Parkinson’s disease (PD). Because DBS did not require
purposeful destruction of brain tissue and its potential for adjust-
ments over time, DBS came to be seen as clinically preferable to
pallidotomy.
So if the initial reason for excitement about DBS was deriva-
tive of a resurgence of excitement in pallidotomy, the question
becomes why the resurgence of pallidotomy in the 1980’s when it
had been performed in essentially the same manner since at least
the 1950’s? It was not due to advances in surgical technique or
the realization that there would be patients who have no alterna-
tives. Indeed, leading functional and stereotactic neurosurgeons
were using the same basic approach, such as ventriculograms,
for targeting in the 1990’s that were used in the 1960’s (Hariz
et al., 2010). Similarly it is not the case that suddenly in the late
1980’s, alternative treatments, such as levodopa, started to fail at
increasing rates. The long term complications and limitations of
levodopa therapy were recognized in the 1970’s.
The argument can be made that it was the evolution of notions
about the pathophysiology of the basal ganglia in PD that shifted
the intellectual environment for the natural selection of the idea
of pallidotomy as an interesting therapy. The evolution and pop-
ularization of the GPi Rate theory provided an apparent cogent
rationale as to why pallidotomy should work. This consilience
between neurosurgery, neurology, and theories of pathophysiol-
ogy is seen in the essay by Goetz et al. (1993). The targeting
of the subthalamic nucleus (STN), initially for surgical ablation
and later for DBS, was a direct result of the GPi Rate theory,
which posited over-activity of the STN contributing to the patho-
logical over-activity of the GPi. It turns out that these concepts
are incorrect but those issues have been addressed elsewhere
(Montgomery, 2007). Thus, the historical fact of contemporane-
ous development of the GPi Rate theory and the resurgence of
interest in pallidotomy is likely to be more than coincidence and
it is reasonable to suggest a causal connection.
If the inference above is true, the fact that a theory could make
such a difference in providing medical care is striking. For many
reasons, the GPi Rate theory captured the imagination of clin-
icians and scientists alike and was protected by the well-known
phenomenon of Confirmation Bias, favoring observations sup-
portive of pre-conceptions. The Confirmation Bias raised the bar
for demonstrations of evidence to the contrary or to find support
to explore alternatives. Studies in 1986 (Montgomery et al., 1986)
but not replicated until 2009 (Wang et al., 2009) demonstrated
parkinsonism in non-human primates in the absence of changes
in neuronal activities predicted by the GPi Rate theory. Indeed,
the GPi Rate theory seems to have withstood a very large amount
of contrary data, for example, that pallidotomies do not produce
involuntary movements, see review by Obeso et al. (2000).
What was so powerful about the GPi Rate theory that so
many scientists, physicians, and surgeons were swayed? First it
was a narrative that had strong intuitive appeal which human
nature finds most irresistible, even in the face of contrary evi-
dence (Johnson-Laird, 2006). This psychological predisposition
to over-attribute explanatory power to intuitively appealing theo-
ries has been carefully documented in experimental psychological
studies (Johnson-Laird, 2006) and scientists studying basal gan-
glia pathophysiology and DBS mechanisms are not somehow
uniquely immune. Thus, it is possible that the over-attribution of
explanatory power to the GPi Rate theory established the theory
as a presupposition taken as fact. In the opinion of this author, the
presupposition of the basic tenants of the GPi Rate theory have
been to the detriment of theories of basal ganglia pathophysiol-
ogy and subsequently, to theories regarding the mechanisms of
action of DBS.
LOGICAL FALLACIES IN DBS RESEARCH
It is a matter of historical fact that one of the first hypotheses
as to the therapeutic mechanism of action of DBS was that high
frequency stimulation produced inhibition or suppression of neu-
ronal activities in the stimulated target (Benazzouz et al., 1995).
As there were as yet no direct observations of neuronal activities
during stimulation, the claim was based on two factors. First was
the similarity of clinical effects between destructive lesions and
DBS. Thalamotomy and pallidotomy produced the same clinical
changes as did DBS of the ventrolateral thalamus (VL) and GPi,
respectively. Second, the notion of high frequency DBS inhibit-
ing or suppressing neuronal activities in the GPi and in the STN
resonated with the GPi Rate theory. It is important to note that
the hypothesis that high frequency DBS inhibits or suppresses the
neurons in the target stimulated was not just a hypothesis viewed
as tentative as any other. Rather, this hypothesis had the epistemic
status of a fact as evidenced by the difficulty several investigators
had trying to offer alternative but equally support hypotheses.
To be sure, there have been a number of studies that demon-
strate reduced neuronal activities in structures subject to high fre-
quency DBS (Boraud et al., 1996; Dostrovsky et al., 2000; Beurrier
et al., 2001; Kiss et al., 2002) as well as studies demonstrating the
contrary (Dostrovsky et al., 1999; Carlson et al., 2010). However,
science is not a “majority vote” and one approach, barrowed
from philosophy, for adjudicating between contrary evidence is
discussed latter.
The inference from the similarity of clinical responses between
thalamotomy and pallidotomy to VL DBS (which will be used
as shorthand for DBS in the vicinity of the VL) and GPi DBS
(which will be used as shorthand for DBS in the vicinity of the
GPi), respectively, can be reconstructed as the logical argument
form if a implies c and b implies c then a implies b. In this
case, a refers to GPi DBS, b refers to pallidotomy and c refers
to improvement in the symptoms of PD. The fallacy of this log-
ical form described is called the Fallacy of Pseudo-transitivity
(Goodwin and Johnson-Laird, 2008). The falsity is demonstrated
when one substitutes for a “stroke,” b “curare,” and c “weak-
ness.” Certainly stroke implies weakness (a implies c) and curare
implies weakness (b implies c) but one would not conclude that
stroke implies curare (a implies b). Consequently, the Fallacy of
Pseudo-transitivity is not a method of scientific validation. It is
not evidence in support of the hypothesis that high frequency
DBS inhibits the target structure.
The Fallacy of Pseudo-transitivity does have positive value in
the generation of hypotheses. For example, Mary Walker sug-
gested the fallacy by hypothesizing that just as some mechanism
of curare poisoning implies weakness and some mechanism
of myasthenia gravis implies weakness, then curare poison-
ing implies myasthenia gravis. As anti-cholinesterase inhibitors
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improve curare perhaps they might improve myasthenia gravis,
and to patients’ great relief, the anti-cholinesterases were found
to do so. In this case, the Fallacy of Pseudo-transitivity was bene-
ficial, but note that it was used for hypothesis generation and not
as scientific validation as many have used for the notion that high
frequency DBS inhibits.
There is evidence from a number of studies that DBS acti-
vates the output from the stimulated targets. For example, STN
DBS (which will be used as shorthand for DBS in the vicinity of
the STN) drives activity in GPi as evidenced by neuronal record-
ings in humans (Reese et al., 2011) and non-human primates and
which, by the way, does not worsen or produce parkinsonism
(Montgomery and Gale, 2008). STN DBS increases drive of the
GPi as measured by cyclic guanosine monophosphate (cGMP)
levels in micro-dialysis studies in humans (Stefani et al., 2005,
2006). There is evidence from animal studies and non-human
studies that high frequency DBS of the GPi does not inhibit
GPi at least as measured by the neuronal responses of neurons
that receive GPi output such as the VL (Anderson et al., 2003;
Montgomery, 2006).
To be sure, there have been a number of neuronal recording
studies in targets being stimulated (Dostrovsky et al., 2000) and
some such as the GPi show a reduction in GPi neuronal activities
(Dostrovsky et al., 2000). Consequently, this is some dissonance
between observations of reduced neuronal activity within the GPi
while the GPi is being stimulated and inhibition of the VL with
GPi DBS demonstrating driving of GPi output. This conundrum
apparently has been resolved by the computational modeling of
neurons in response to DBS demonstrating reduction in action
potentials in the soma and dendrites while action potential gen-
eration at the axon hillock or first inter-node (McIntyre et al.,
2004). The modeling recapitulated early demonstrations of simi-
lar phenomena in biological preparations (Coombs et al., 1957;
Llinas and Terzuolo, 1964; Stuart and Hausser, 1994; Gulledge
and Stuart, 2003; Dugladze et al., 2012).
The studies described above leave the question as to the pri-
marymechanism of DBS; local inhibition of the GPi at the level of
the soma and dendrites, which would be consistent with the GPi
Rate theory, or increased GPi output with GPi DBS which would
be inconsistent with the GPi Rate theory. To some degree, this
debate has been resolved by the demonstration by R. Reese and
colleagues of increased GPi activity with therapeutic STN DBS in
a patient with PD (Reese et al., 2011). It is now clear that increased
activity in the STN likely is not causal to Parkinsonism. Patients
with unilateral STN DBS experience ipsilateral benefit despite
increased drive of the contralateral STN with DBS of the ipsilat-
eral STN. This increased drive is associated with both antidromic
and orthodromic activation of the STN contralateral to the STN
being stimulated (Walker et al., 2011).
Interestingly, a study of the response of neurons of the sub-
stantia nigra pars reticulata (SNpr) suggested decreased neu-
ronal activity in the SNpr with STN stimulation in the rodent
(Benazzouz et al., 1995). As the STN sends excitatory drive to
the SNpr, the reduction of SNpr neuronal activity was taken as
evidence of DBS inhibition of the SNpr. However, the problem
was the neuronal activity in the SNpr was measured immedi-
ately following the stimulation train, as they were not able to
remove the stimulus artifact. Studies of GPi neuronal activities
with STN DBS in the non-human primate demonstrate increased
neuronal activity that decreases below baseline immediately fol-
lowing the cessation of DBS (Montgomery, 2003). This suggests
that what happens following DBS is not necessarily what is seen
immediately following DBS and consequently, the findings by
Benazzouz and colleagues described above and similar subse-
quent studies in humans (Lafreniere-Roula et al., 2010) have no
bearing on what happens during DBS and the use of activity fol-
lowing DBS as evidence of what occurs during DBS is a logical
fallacy.
Attribution of the changes in neuronal activity immediately
following DBS to changes during DBS is a logical fallacy called the
Category Error (Ryle, 2000). One wonders whether extrapolation
of changes in metabolism that underlie fMRI and other neu-
rometabolic imaging to inferences of underlying neuronal activity
similarly risk the logical fallacy of the Category Error. Certainly,
there is not a direct coupling of metabolism and neuronal activity
(Logothetis, 2007). Indeed, some studies demonstrate decreased
metabolism in the motor cortex in patients with PD during
therapeutic DBS (Haslinger et al., 2005). Yet, STN DBS evoked
potentials from electroencephalographic (EEG) recordings con-
sistent with antidromic activation (Baker et al., 2002; Walker
et al., 2012) argue for increased activity in the motor cortex.
Increased motor cortex neuronal activity in non-human primates
with STN DBS also has been demonstrated (Montgomery and
Gale, 2008). The point here for scientists is that the conscientious
scientist should exert caution, with a default position of skep-
ticism, when inferring neuronal activity from neurometabolic
imaging. Further, past claims DBS mechanisms drawn from neu-
rometabolic imaging should be regarded as suspect, at least until
proven otherwise.
Even a cursory survey will demonstrate that the vast major-
ity of published studies on DBS mechanisms of action have been
directed at the target stimulated. Even when neurons in other
structures receiving monosynaptic inputs from the stimulated
structure, the inferences are always in terms of the events going
on within the stimulated structure. Papers are titled “Effects of
STN DBS” as though the effects were entirely mediated by STN.
It is rare to find a paper that describes the “Effects of DBS on
structures in the vicinity of the STN.” It would be disingen-
uous to suggest that the latter was implied or implicit in the
former.
It is now clear that DBS in the vicinity of the STN activates,
rather than inhibits, many neurons and particularly the axons
and axonal terminals, which have the lowest threshold for elec-
trical stimulation. There is evidence that DBS in the vicinity
of the STN activates axon terminals projecting from the motor
and somatosensory cortex causing antidromic responses in these
structures (Montgomery and Gale, 2008; Walker et al., 2012).
STN DBS causes antidromic activation of the contralateral STN
neurons (Walker et al., 2011). In addition, monosynaptic and
polysynaptic activations percolate throughout the basal ganglia-
thalamic-cortical system (Montgomery and Gale, 2008). Indeed,
Vitek and colleagues demonstrate the DBS in the vicinity of the
STN modulates neuronal activity in the cerebellar receiving areas
of VL (Xu et al., 2008).
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So the question arises, given the observations described above,
how can anyone make any claims as to STN function as a conse-
quence of DBS in the vicinity of the STN? The matter is no less
problematic for DBS in the vicinity of the GPi, which also gener-
ates antidromic activation of VL neurons, which also is likely to
generate orthodromic action potentials in axons of VL neurons
projecting to the cortex and other areas (Montgomery, 2006). Yet
a cursory survey of the published literature will demonstrate no
paucity of such claims even without so much as a caveat.
It is striking how little concern there appears to be for the pos-
sibility of the DBS effects having nothing to do with the functions
of the stimulated target. In fact, the benefit of STN DBS may
have nothing to do with the STN. Studies in the rodent model
of parkinsonism demonstrate that increases or decreases in STN
neuronal activities have no effect on the parkinsonism (Gradinaru
et al., 2009).
If the DBS effect is related to stimulation-induced neu-
ronal changes percolated throughout the basal ganglia-thalamic-
cortical system (systems effect), than attributing the functions of
the system to a single structure is an example of a Mereological
Fallacy, which is attributing to a part the function of the whole, on
which Aristotle wrote. Consider the situation where there are five
workers involved in each and every process of the operations of a
machine. One could interfere with the actions of any one worker
and the machine will fail. The fallacy is disrupting the activities
of the first worker and when the machine fails, attributing the
machine functions solely to the first worker. In terms of DBS sci-
ence, the error is in studying one structure to the exclusion of
others and then attributing the therapeutic mechanisms to the
single structure studied. Even a cursory survey of the literature
will demonstrate that the overwhelming majority of studies have
been confined to the study of a single structure.
The Mereological Fallacy can be mitigated by systematic study
of the many components within the relevant system, in this case
the basal ganglia-thalamic-cortical system. One could argue that
neurometabolic imaging is one such approach; however, to date,
these methods lack the spatial and temporal resolution necessary
to address the relevant time scale of the underlying dynamics.
Alternative approaches could include the same manipulations
within various components separately with outcome measures
that assess the same physiological domain. For example, it is now
clear that DBS of nearly all the components of the basal ganglia-
thalamic-cortical system improve bradykinesia PD (Montgomery
et al., 2011). However, there may be many forms of or mech-
anisms underlying bradykinesia, and thus, the phenomena of
bradykinesia would have to be dissected. Demonstration that the
same fundamental mechanisms are affected regardless of the site
stimulated would argue for a “systems” effect rather than a “part”
effect.
The Mereological fallacy is compounded by the Fallacy of
Limited Alternatives. This fallacy is of the form a and b are possible
explanations of c, a has been disproved, then bmust be the explana-
tion of c. Clearly, there may be any number of other explanations
and b may very well be wrong as an explanation. However, just
eliminating a seems to convey validity on b which is fallacious.
Thus, demonstrating an effect of DBS on the neuronal activities
of the structure stimulated seems to be enough to convince most
scientists that the local effects somehow are necessary and suffi-
cient. It might be sufficient because the local structure is part of
the system but it is not necessary. Again, even a cursory review of
the literature would demonstrate a paucity of publications where
all the reasonable alternative hypotheses were discussed.
Another fallacy often committed in the science of DBS is the
Fallacy of Confirming the Consequence. This fallacy often is com-
bined with Conformation Bias. The Fallacy of Confirming the
Consequence is of the form if a implies b is true and b is true than
a is true. This form is false because b could be true for any number
of reasons other than a. One example would be the argument that
if the GPi is overactive in PD then pallidotomy should improve
PD. The observation is true that pallidotomy improves PD, which
then is taken as evidence for the validity of the theory that over-
activity of the GPi caused Parkinsonism, which is false. Note that
the Fallacy of Confirming the Consequence sets up the Fallacy
of Pseudo-transitivity that was seen as validating the equivalence
between pallidotomy and pallidal DBS as described above.
If the consequences or observations are to be taken as proof of
the hypothesis in the fallacy described above, then one can readily
appreciate the dangers of being selective as to which consequent
observation is taken as evidence. There is the human tendency to
select those observations that are consistent with the hypothesis,
known as Confirmation Bias and disregard, actively or passively,
any contrary observations. Thus, the Confirmation Bias results
in selecting a predicted observation (b in the logical form above)
that already presupposes the hypothesis (a in the logical form).
For example, the GPi Rate theory predicts improved PD with pal-
lidotomy and consequently, the observation of improved PD with
pallidotmy was taken as evidence of the GPi Rate theory. However,
the GPi Rate theory also predicts that pallidotomy would worsen
involuntary movements. As pallidotomy does not worsen invol-
untary movements, the GPi Rate theory must be wrong. Yet,
Confirmation Bias lead to neglect of the contrary observation that
pallidotomy did not worsen involuntary movements as evidenced
by the persistence of the GPi Rate theory even after the con-
trary evidence was made clear, see review by Obeso et al. (2000).
There is nothing in the observation of pallidotomy improving
PD that trumps the observation that palidotomy does not worsen
involuntary movements.
There are several prominent examples of passive Confirmation
Bias in the failure to address certain observations that are clearly
known but rarely discussed as they apply to DBS science. An
important fact often overlooked in explanations of DBS actions
is the short-term latencies to therapeutic effectiveness (as dis-
tinguished from long-term changes thought related to induced
plasticity). For example, tremor responds to DBS within seconds,
bradykineisa in PD within a few more but gait and balance may
take tens of minutes. Such variability in latencies to effects is not
amendable to explanation by simple depletion of neurotransmit-
ters or accumulation of adenosine (Bekar et al., 2008) or any other
neurohumoral type explanation.
An incredible conceptual insight generally not appreciated, is
that DBS has or will change the nature of dynamics in neural sys-
tems so as to cause a sea change, as it will introduce true realistic
dynamics of the basal ganglia-thalamic-cortical system. This will
change appreciation for and understanding of dynamics, which is
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the change in systems or states over time courses on the order of
milliseconds (ms) in distinction to current concepts of physiology
and pathophysiology, which are static (Montgomery, 2004, 2007,
2010).
The importance of the dynamics on the millisecond time
scale is clear when one considers that, for at least some patients
with PD, 150 pulses per second (pps) DBS of the STN relieves
the disability of PD while 100 pps DBS is ineffective (unpub-
lished observations). The only difference is that the inter-stimulus
spike interval is approximately 3ms, that is 3/1000th of a second,
shorter in the effective compared to ineffective DBS. There is no
generally accepted theory that begins to account for why a 3ms
difference makes a difference.
The Fallacy of Confirming the Consequence is particularly
problematic as it is the essence of the Scientific Method where
hypotheses are tested and then modified if the experiments are
inconsistent. Often unappreciated, the Scientific Method informs
what to do when the consequences of the hypothesis are not
confirmed, that is modify the hypothesis. However, unappreci-
ated is that failure to disprove the hypothesis is not validation of
the hypothesis (Popper, 2002). Therefore, an interesting paradox
results when considering evidence for (consistent with predic-
tion) or against (inconsistent with prediction). As supporting
evidence does not demonstrate the validity of the hypothesis, then
the hypothesis should be rejected solely on the basis of the con-
trary evidence, at least according to the Fallacy of Confirming
the Consequence. Yet, that rarely is the case (Johnson-Laird,
2006).
The resolution of the paradox often is “majority vote” when
the contrary evidence is not ignored outright. This has the per-
verse consequence that a flawed experiment replicated a thousand
times trumps a valid experiment done once. One approach to
addressing this paradox lies in attributing an observation to a
causal or epiphenomenal relationship. However, this is fraught
with difficulties. Another approach would be to barrow a philo-
sophical approach by asking whether a hypothesized mechanism
is a necessary or sufficient cause. A necessary cause is one that the
effect (observation) always co-exists with the cause (the presumed
mechanism). Thus, it takes only a single instance where there is
not a co-existence to refute that the mechanism is necessary.
A conditionmay not be necessary but it may be sufficient. Now
the expectation is not that the observation always be present with
the condition, unlike the condition for necessity described above.
However, the notion of sufficient cause does require that each
time the presumed cause is present, then the observations likewise
must be present.
Applying these considerations to DBS, there is the hypothe-
sis that PD is related to increased oscillatory activity in the beta
frequency range and that DBS reduces this oscillatory activity.
However, it takes only a single example of a patient with PD
lacking increase beta frequency oscillation (assuming no method-
ological error) to disprove increased beta frequency oscillation
as a necessary cause, and thus, that DBS must act by reducing
beta oscillations. Yet, review of the literature rarely described the
presence or absence of beta oscillations in individual subjects
and hence, evidence that increased beta oscillations is a necessary
cause (Weinberger et al., 2009).
To demonstrate that increased beta oscillations cannot be a
sufficient condition, it is only necessary to demonstrate that
Parkinsonism can be absent when there are increased beta oscil-
lations. If one assumes that DBS in the beta frequencies can
drive synchronized activity in basal ganglia in the beta fre-
quency, then the failure to worsen Parkinsonism would be evi-
dence that increased beta oscillations is not a sufficient cause
of Parkinsonism (Tsang et al., 2012). If increased oscillations in
the beta frequency are neither a necessary or sufficient cause of
parkinsonism, then it is epiphenomenal and reduction of beta fre-
quency oscillation cannot be taken, prima facie, as a therapeutic
mechanism of DBS.
A CALL TO RE-EXAMINE ASSUMPTIONS AND
PRESUPPOSITIONS
DBS truly is a revolutionary change in the treatment of neuro-
logical and psychiatric disorders. But its full potential is more
likely to be realized if there is a clear understanding of its mech-
anisms of action. To date, hypotheses as to the mechanisms of
action have been derivative from prevailing implicit presuppo-
sitions and explicit theories of pathophysiology, most of which
are incorrect (Montgomery, 2007; Montgomery and Gale, 2008).
An example is the presumption that high frequency DBS reduces
neuronal activity in the stimulated target because Parkinsonism
is due to overactivity of the STN and GPi. As discussed above, a
therapeutic effect of DBS is reduction in beta oscillations because
increased beta oscillations cause Parkinsonism.
These theories of pathophysiology, such as, the GPi Rate
theory or the Beta Oscillation theory, constitute a risk for
Confirmation Bias that has a high probability of generating false
claims to knowledge. The risks of Confirmation Bias are greatly
magnified by the use of logical fallacies because valid logic, which
serves as a check on the evidence, is not used. To be sure, use
of logical fallacies may be central to the process of hypothe-
sis generation, as in the case of Mary Walker and myasthenia
gravis as described above. However, when these fallacies are used
as evidence, particularly against competing hypotheses, scientific
progress can be impeded.
The clinical benefits of DBS are even more remarkable when
on considers just how “dumb” current DBS is. Current systems
are either “on” at some fixed frequency or “off.” It is indeed for-
tunate that the brain is much smarter as it only needs a bit of
help from the dumb DBS. However, to achieve the full potential
of DBS will require a entirely new conception of brain physiol-
ogy. Though appreciated by L. Galvani (1737–1798), the notion
that the nervous system is basically an electrical device seems to
have been forgotten. The neurotransmitters, the basis for cur-
rent neurohumoral conceptions of the brain (Arikha, 2007), are
merely the messengers not the message and it is the abnormal
messages that are causal to the dysfunction of most neurological
and psychiatric disorders. The current emphasis to explain brain
function and dysfunction in terms of neurotransmitters is like
confining the discussion of computer functions to a discussion
of the electrons alone.
Most physicians are comfortable prescribing medications that
mimic neurotransmitters, and biologicals (therapeutic agents
derived from living cells such as vaccines and tissue transplants)
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while they still view DBS with apprehension bordering on suspi-
cion (personal observation). This may explain the fascination of
gene therapy to change the neurotransmitters in the STN from
glycine to GABA but results to date have not been nearly as effec-
tive as DBS (Kaplitt et al., 2007) and yet require as many or more
penetrations of the brain than DBS making such gene therapy
more risky than DBS. This bias will only change when physicians
are as comfortable at prescribing electricity for the brain as they
are at prescribing pills. For this to happen, the scientists and engi-
neers will have to provide a cogent understanding of how DBS
works which is not likely to happen if scientists and engineers
cannot see the flaws of current theories and approaches.
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